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STA TEI1ENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff, Gustave E. Bush, filed an action to quiet title to
real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, basing his claim upon
a forged deed.

Subsequently plaintiff was granted Summary Judgment

against the Defendants, which judgment quieted title in the Plaintiff.
The Respondent as a Third Party Plaintiff filed an action against
the Appellant, with the Respondent as the insured.

This action was

based upon the premise that if the Plaintiff was successful in quieting
title against the Defendants, then this defect was covered by the title
insurance policies issued by the Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following a trial without a jury the court entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment in favor of the Respondent,
The Lockhart Co.
RELEASE SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent asks that the Judgment entered by the District
Court be affirmed, and that the Respondent be awarded costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this Appeal.
STA TEI-IG\T OF FACTS
In the early part of June, 1975, the Respondent, the Lockhart Co.,
made loans to the Defendants, llickey 1·1. Coult and Patricia Ann Coult,
(hereinafter referred to as "Coults ") and to the Defendants, l·lerrill
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\~ilson

Harward and Vera f-1ae Harward, (hereinafter referred to as

( "Harwards ").

The Caul ts executed a Promissory Note in the amount of

$25,118.00 and the Harwards executed a Note in the amount of $25,117.00.
As security for these Notes, Coults and Harwards executed Trust Deeds
and conveyed to The Lockhart Co. as Trustee, certain real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
On or about the 24th day of 14ay, 1975, the Appellant, Commonwealth
Land Title Insurance Company, issued to The Lockhart Co. as the insured,
a Commitment for Title Insurance insuring the title to the properties
conveyed by the Defendants, Coults and Harwards.
wealth thereafter on each piece
ance policies.

(Ex. P-5)

Common-

of property issued separate title insur-

Both policies were in the amount of $25,117.00.

(Ex.

P-6, P-7)
On November 13, 1975, the Respondent was served with a Summons and
Complaint filed by the plaintiff, Gustave E. Bush.

t1r. Bush claimed

ownership in Fee Simple to the property which The Lockhart Co. had taken
as security for the money loaned to Caul ts and Han,ards.

The Respondent

thereafter tendered defense of the lawsuit by f·1r. Bush to the Appellant
on December 10, 1975.

(Ex. P-8)

By letter dated January 16, 1976, the

Appellant declined to undertake the defense of this action on behalf of
The Lockhart Co.

(Ex. P-9)

1·1r. Bush thereafter obtained a Summary Judgment in his favor against
the Defendants, Coults and Harwards and against the Respondent, The Lockhart Co., wherein it was determined that ltr. Bush did have fee simple ownership to the properties which had been given by the Coul ts 0nd Han1ards
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to The Lockhart Co. as security for the monies loaned.

In his Affidavit

filed with his 1·1otion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Bush stated that he had

examined the proported conveyances from himself to the Defendants, Mickey
t~.

Coult and Patricia Ann Coult, and that the signature thereon of one

Gustave E. Bush was not made by him personally or by anyone else with
his knowledge or under his authority or under his direction.

Because

of this forgery there exists a defect in the titles of said property
and the Appellant by virtue of its title policies insured The Lockhart
Co. against this defect.
The Respondent obtained judgment against the Defendants, Coults and
Han~ards

and has released its liens against the properties.

Its claim in

this lawsuit is only against the Appellant and judgment was entered in favor
of the Respondent, The Lockhart

Co. , against the Appellant.

The Respondent

made the loans to Coults and Harwards after obtaining the title policies
from Appellant.

The Respondent's employee, Gary Lyons, did not order the

insurance commitment.

It was ordered by

t~ickey

Coult after Appellant had

already agreed to insure the property long before Lockhart
picture (T. 495, 532, 554-555).

~1as

ever in the

Gary Lyons, did not knoH Jerome Yeck's

reputation; in fact, there is no evidence linking Jerome Yeck to the defect
involved in this lawsuit.
ARGUI1ENT
HIE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE Tf\IAL COURT'S FINDI"JGS Or FACT
All of the facts set forth in Appellant's brief were considered
b) the Trial Court.

The Trial Court entered its findings of fact based

upon all the evidence and the Trial Court's findings should be sustained.
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The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the findings of the trial
court should be sustained unless evidence clearly preponduates against
them.

Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137

(1972); Stucki v. Stucki, 562 P.2d 240 (Utah 1977).

The record supports

the trial court's conclusion that the Respondent had no knowledge of any
defect or other matter which would preclude Respondent from recovering
its losses under the title insurance policies issued by the Appellant.
In making its Findings of Fact, the trial Court took judicial notice of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment entered by
the Third District Court in favor of the Plaintiff, Gustave E. Bush,
wherein it was held that Bush is the owner in fee simple of the property
in which Respondent had a lien, and that Bush never executed any deed or
document conveying any interest to any of the defendants, and that the
purported conveyance from himself to Coults does not contain the signature of Gustave E. Bush. (R. 219).

The Trial Court also found that

Respondent had no knowledge of this defect or any other defect, lien,
encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter affecting title to the property which would preclude recovery by the Respondent against the Appellant. (R.219,220).
Focusing in on the issue asserted by the Appellant, that Respondent
was told of a deed to a Deseret Distributing Co., and that Respondent
assumed that Jerome Yeck may have an interest in the property, there
is no evidence whatsoever linking Jerome Yeck or Deseret Distributing
to a forged deed.

There is no evidence whatsoever that f:espofldent kne1·1

or even had reason to know of Yeck's reputation with the title insurance
companies.

There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent suffered 1ts
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losses as a result of any claim by Yeck or Deseret Distributing, or as
a result of a forgery by Jerome Yeck.

Yet, Appellant is relying totally

on the fact that Respondent was told of a deed to Deseret Distributing
and that Respondent assumed that Yeck may have had an interest in the.
property.

This is the "credible" evidence which Appellant argues, re-

quires this Court to reverse the Trial Court's findings.

All of the

testimony elicited by Appellant as to Jerome Yeck is not material absent
a showing that (1) Yeck's involvement affected title to the property and
(2) Respondent had actual knowledge that Yeck's involvement affected
title to the property.

\1ithout this evidence the trial court found

Appellant liable to Respondent under its title insurance policies.
An examination of the title insurance policies is also important.
(Ex. P-6 & P-7).

These policies are identical in form and language.

The Appellant relies on paragraph 3 of its "Exclusions from Coverage."
This "Exclusions" section cannot be read,
laY~sui t,

hm~ever.,

in context of this

without reading the section entitled "Mortgagee's Title Insur-

ance Policy" directly above the Exclusion section.

This section is

"subject to the Exclusion from Coverage," and specifies what "loss or
damage" is covered.

If the insured suffers loss as a result of any of

the causes specified, and there is no exclusion as to that cause then
the title company is liable for the insured's loss.
The judgment quieting title in Mr. Bush established the defect and
as a

result of that defect, the Respondent suffered loss, i.e., it lost

its interest in the property.

Respondent suffered no loss or damage as

a result of a deed to Deseret Distributing or as a result of Hr. Jerome
leek.

The few facts known by Respondent, which Appellant is claiming

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

come within the exclusions, do not even give rise to a claim by Respond-'
ent under the policy.

There is no question but that Respondent would

not be entitled to claim damage as a result of a lien which was not the
cause of Respondent's loss.
A contract of title insurance is an agreement to indemnify those

I
I

who actually suffer loss through a defect in title, and is not a contract
of guaranty, and in order to recover thereon an insured must establish a
loss resulting from the defect, and until a loss occurs, there is no
liability.

Sattler v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 162 A.2d 22
).

(Pa., t?Co

Respondent is not contending that Appellant is liable

to Respondent based on the fact that there was an unrecorded deed to
Deseret Distributlng or that Jerome Yeck may have claimed an interest in
the property, because Respondent suffered no loss as a result.
ledge thereof is immaterial in this lawsuit.
there

~;as

Any know-

What is material is that

a defect, a fact not disputed by Appellant, and that Respondent

suffered loss as a result of that defect and had no knowledge of the
defect, again facts not disputed by Appellant.
\'!hat Appellant is saying is that Respondent cannot collect on the
defect which caused the loss because it knew of facts totally unrelated
to the loss.

Appellant is relying for this argument on

langua~e

in the

policy to the effect that Respondent knew of facts, which if known to
Aopellant, would have precluded issuance of the policies.

Simply, the

policies do not say what Appellant is contending they say.

Appellant

contends that because Respondent did not give Appellant written notice
of Jerome Yeck, Deseret Distributing Coc::pany or the rejection of title
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\

I

I

.

insurance by \·/estern States Title that Respondent is precluded from re-

,

'I

covering on a loss which had no connection with Jerome Yeck, Deseret
Distributing or the rejection by

~/estern

States Title.

The exclusion

language cannot be interpreted as suggested by Appellant.
pretation would

a11o~l

Such an inter-

a title company to deny any claim on the basis

that "other matters" unrelated to the loss had not been disclosed in
writing.
It is the widely accepted rule that title insurance policies should
be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer.
Hall by Goodell v. San Jose Abstract & Title Insurance Co., 172 Cal 2d 421,
342 P.2d 362 (J), H. Trisdale Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co., 146 Cal
2d 831, 304 P.2d 832

f9~'

); Overholtzer v. Northern Counties Title

Insurance Co., 116 Cal 2d 113, 253 P.Zd 116 (

19~J

).

An earlier

California case involving language construction of a title policy said:

The courts have also announced a **** to the effect
that when the language employed in an insurance contract is ambiguous, or when a doubt arises in respect
to the application, exceptions to, or limitations of
liability thereunder, they should be interpreted most
favorably to the insured. **** Where the language and
terms of a policy are framed and formulated by the
insurer, every ambiguity and uncertainty therein
should be resolved in favor of the insured. Coast
l·lutual Building Loan Ass' n v. Security Title TrlSUrance
S Guaranty Co., 57 P.2d 1392 (Cal. 1936).
In oarticular,

·~revisions

relating to exclusions or exceptions

from the performance of the insured's obligations are construed strictly
against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured."

Paramount

Properties v. Transamerica Title Co., 463 P.2d 746, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394
(1970).

It is evident that the above cited rule of construction used

in t 1 tle insurance cases was derived from its general insurance counterSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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part.

The rule on the level of general insurance has been expressly

adopted in Utah by the Courts' statements that insurance policies should
be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the
insurer.

Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 13 Utah 2d 303, 373

P.2d 580 (1962); Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Co., 107 Utah 478,
155 P.2d 173 (

,qq~

).

The Respondent respectfully submits that the policies in question
(ex. P-6 and P-7) and the commitment (Ex. P-5) are not subject to the
construction given them by Appellant.
these findings should not be disturbed.
sho~1

The trial court so found, and
The Appellant has failed to

that these findings are not supported by the evidence.

Appellant

is attempting 1n its brief, as it did at trial, to make something out
of nothing.

At trial, Appellant's theory was to show Gary Lyons as the

"architect" of a scheme to defraud and conceal facts from the Appellant.
Contrary to this theory, the evidence is clear and convincing that there
1'as no such scheme.

To advance this theme on appeal, Appellant has mis-

stated facts and testimony.

For example, on P. 6 of Appellant's brief,

Appellant infers that Gary Lyons suggested that the defendants get a
policy fr-om some other- titlE

company.

On the contrnry, both llr. Coult

and llr. Lyons testified that l·lr. Coult suggested another title company
(Tr:

495; 532, 554).

In fact, l·lr. Coult testified that Appellant had al-

ready issued a commitment on this property before Respondent was ever
involved, and that he suggested that it be used.

(m

532. 554).

llr.

Coult contacted Appellant and had Respondent named as insured. (TR. 555)
Also on P. 17 Appellant misstates the testimony given by Del

~owl~)·
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In

summarizing 1·1r. Rowley's testimony, Appellant says:

"That he (Lyons)

had told the loan applicants that if they could get another company to
write

the title insurance, the loan could be made ••• "

testimony of

~1r.

The actual

Rowley says: " ..• so they asked him (Lyons) i f he got

title insurance through another company if he could still make the
loan ••. "

(TR 461) (emphasis added).

that of Lyons and Coult.
Appellant.
tion.

There is no

This testimony is consistent with

The Respondent was not attempting to mislead
evidence Mr. Lyons knew of Jerome Yeck's reputa-

There was nothing to hide.
The foregoing facts are not really material to the question of the

sufficiency of the evidence, but Respondent feels they should be correctly stated so as not to mislead this Court.
important, however, to

shm~

These statements are

that there was no concealment or misrepresent-

ation on the part of the Respondent.

The evidence supports the court's

findings on this point.
Furthermore, Appellant's reliance upon Utah Code Ann. §31-19-8
(163), and the numerous insurance cases cited in its brief, is misplaced.
This statute and all the cases cited only have application to insurance
policies requiring a written application as evidenced by the entire
chapter 19 in the Utah Code.

Utah Code Ann. §31-19-5, 6 & 7 (1953).

Title insurance contracts differ from insurance contracts in this regord.

There is no application in title insurance, of the nature required

by Section 31-19-7 and the representations mentioned in §31-19-8 are
representations on a

11

ri tten application.

Title insurance contracts

are warranties and the insurer actually determines the state of the title.
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This is made clear in Research Loan & Invest. Corp. v. Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp. 225 F. Supp. 287

(~I.D.t~o.

1964) Rev at 361 F.2d 764 (1966),

which cites Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Truste Co.,
225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E.468 (1918), one of the leading cases on title insurance in the country, which examined the purpose and object of a title
insurance policy.

The court noted

" ••• to a layman a [title} search is a mystery, and the
various pitfalls that may beset his title are dreaded,
but unknown."
It [Empire] then held that:
"To avoid a possible claim against him, to obviate the
need and expense of.professional advice, and the uncertainty that sometimes results even after it has
been obtained, is the very purpose for which the owner
seeks insurance."
That case [Empire] continued:
"A title policy is much in the nature of a covenant of
warranty or a covenant against encumbrances. (emphasis
added) 225F.Supp at 289, 290.
The Eighth Circuit Court. of Appeals, in reversing the District court, did
not disturb these concepts of title insurance.

Rather, the circuit court

reinforced them:
"This appeal raises serious questions concerning the
fundamental nature of title insurance .•. Usually, the
very purpose and essence of the title insurance transaction is to obtain a professional title search,
opinion and guarantee. The policy of title insurance
is in the nature of a rmrranty." 361 F.2d at 767
(emphasis added).
The law does not impose any duty upon an applicant for title insurance to
do the work of the title insurance company. Id at 290.

The very purpose

Respondent required title insurance was to protect it against the type of
loss i t suffered as a result of a forged deed.

There simply is no evidence

that Respondent concealed or misrepresented facts which it knew would influence the risk of issuing the title policies in question.

If Respondent
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kne1·1, and policy requires "actual knowledge," that the deed was forged
and failed to notify Appellant in writing, the Appellant's Exclusion
section would be applicable.

But to say Respondent knew facts which are

in no way related to the loss, is a gross restructure of the conditions
of the policy.

Even the Statute (Utah Code Ann. §31-19-8) quoted by

Appellant on p.21-22 of its brief requires that'concealed or misrepresented facts be related to the "hazard resulting in the loss."
In every life and fire insurance case cited by Appellant, the concealed or misrepresented fact was related to the hazard resulting in the
loss.

If, for example, an applicant for life insurance concealed a heart

condtion, but died of cancer, the insurer could not deny coverage, because
the fact concealed did not cause the loss.

This is exactly the farfetched

concept Appellant is asking this court to accept.

The trial court rejected

this contention, and the evidence supports the trial court's findings that
Respondent had no knowledge of the defect which caused the loss (forgery)
or which would preclude recovery by the Respondent.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent asks this court to affirm the

lm~er

Respondent its costs and attorneys fees on this appeal.
upon b> Appellant \'las considered by the trial court.

court and to award
The evidence relied

The Appellant failed

to meet its burden of proving that Respondent had actual knowledge of the
alleged defect on any other matter which resulted in Respondent's loss.

RESPECTFULLY SUrniiTTED,

(}JDJ~
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